Introduction
The onset of the sovereign debt crisis coincided with the formal incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) into EU law by the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. If the former has dominated the subsequent politics and economics of the European Union, the Charter would seem, on its face, to have had equally profound effects on the legal sphere. Between 1 December 2009 and 31 December 2014 it was cited no less than 353 times by the Court of Justice and has been deployed in many salient cases. 1 Yet, scratch beyond these headlines, and its transformative effects seem limited. It is rarely successfully used as a source of EU legislative review 2 and its influence on EU institutional practice is unclear. 3 Attempts to widen its remit led to an embarrassing retreat in the face of within it by establishing autonomy for her there, setting out dimensions to this autonomy and by securing a value for this autonomy.
EU law relies, consequently, on a representation of EU fundamental rights as an integral part of government of the European political economy. This has shaped their interpretation and remit, often highly problematically. The Charter intensified this process in a number of ways. It integrated them far more tightly into this governmental order so that their claims were increasingly tied to the demands of EU government. Alongside this, it led to their being conceived as about realising collective goods with a corresponding instrumentalisation and relativizing of many entitlements. Finally, it shifted the burden for protecting fundamental rights away from administrative actors onto private actors as the latter have become perceived as increasingly central to government of the European political economy. All these trends raise challenging issues, but, it will be concluded, all direct the Charter away from addressing the suffering provoked by the sovereign debt crisis.
I. A European Union Stabilitas
Two leitmotifs dominate analysis of EU fundamental rights law. One is cynicism. EU fundamental rights law, on this account, uses the rhetorical appeal of fundamental rights to push forward European integration and extend the reach of Union institutional power. Such an argument is unclear why fundamental rights would be invoked when they generate political costs or whether this insincerity applies to other areas of EU law. The other meme is legal splicing. A series of discrete doctrines govern methods of interpreting the Charter, the standard of protection secured by it, its relationship to other instruments and its scope of review. These are spliced together to form EU fundamental rights law. Such splicing is thin on how different aspects of EU fundamental rights law relate to each other or to EU law as a whole. Without this, however, fundamental rights do not have the coherence to set out an imaginary of what is good and right, something central both to their moral status and their iconographic appeal.
Both approaches conceive EU fundamental rights as standing apart from other EU law. Yet the Treaties state that EU fundamental rights are both an integral part of EU law 6 and the central values on which the Union is founded. 7 This claim to separateness is misconceived for other reasons. Even those proclaiming the moral qualities of fundamental rights acknowledge that their value and distinctiveness from other moral claims lie in their reliance on the wider legal order for their implementation and bite. 8 This relationship is not simply institutional. If fundamental rights are used to symbolise, justify and vision a legal order 9 that legal order acts as the relay through which their meaning and implications are elaborated. EU fundamental rights, for example, governing immigration, data protection or broadcasting might have to be translated into the language of immigration, broadcasting or data protection law, and set out in terms allowing for the continued operation of activities in these fields. It is, consequently, possible to talk of a regulatory relationship in which fundamental rights rely on the wider legal order for their execution and jurisdiction. There is also an epistemic relationship in which fundamental rights and the wider legal order supply meaning and understanding to one another. There is a normative relationship whereby each serves to justify the other.
This relationship cannot simply be between individual EU fundamental rights provisions and other EU laws. This would simply produce a multiplicity of legal dots with no indication of how these relate to each other and what they come together to mean and do more generally. Nor can it provide any reason for subjects obeying the law other than a caseby-case basis on the merits of each case. In other words, it can neither explain the coherence of EU law, what it represents or its authority. This failure would seem particularly acute in an account with fundamental rights at its heart as, if the latter do not act to imbue a legal order with a richer sense of coherence, signification and authority, it is not clear what they do.
A relationship must be identified between EU fundamental rights and EU law as a whole.
This relationship cannot be simply a formal one as legal texts alone cannot explain how EU law is used, and, therefore, what it does and the patterns of meaning, symbolism and representation which emerge from that. Nor can they explain questions of coherence or authority as how a text is related to another text or the reasons for obeying it cannot be found simply in the language of the text. Resort has often been had to some moral foundation to relate this altogether. This can either take the form of some rule-based system of ethics or of a more diffuse ethical awareness. 10 The difficulties with such an approach are two-approach. First, it is de-institutionalised. Any relationship has to be, above all, an institutional account. It has to emerge out of the interpretations of institutional actors, be these courts, legislatures or administrators, who relate EU fundamental laws to a wider view of the EU legal order. Such accounts do not this. They are, thus, not only unconvincing as depictions of EU law but also normatively problematic. Any such external view relies on the imposition of a particular order on what is taking place, and this imposition is unproblematised and authoritarian. In this case, these accounts put forward this injunction as a European one. It is never explained why this is or should be so with the consequence that they become first and foremost attempts at system-building. The second problem with these accounts is that they are underspecified. Law is a regulatory tool and creates a vision of the world. To secure this role for EU law, any relationship has to set out how it relates individuals to each other, to things, to the institutions and social processes that make up their lives, to particular places, and to wider belief-systems. These accounts do not really do this.
The relationship has to emerge, therefore, out of an institutional account of what EU law and EU fundamental rights are about when the latter are interpreted. These will not be found explicitly in one or two individual judgments as these alone will not be able to set out a sufficiently general panorama nor will they be able to set out the assumptions of what EU law is about which guide their interpretation. Instead, it is to be found in these collective assumptions and background understandings which are used to make sense of both EU law and EU fundamental rights, and which locate these in '… a wider grasp of our whole 10 On this see, respectively, P. Eleftheriadis, 'The Moral Distinctiveness of the European Union' (2011) 9 I-CON 69; K. Jaklic, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (2014, OUP, Oxford) 278 etseq. predicament, how we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, how we relate to other groups, etc.' 11 Such assumptions rest on inherited shared templates. Those identified with the State make little sense as the Union has inherited no notion of nationhood or the organological features which structure modern Statehood. 12 The Union is rather a socio-political order which places the individual qua actor and qua collective idea at its heart. It is a social order insofar as EU law seeks to recreate and represent complex patterns of interaction. It is a political order insofar as this is done through elaborate institutional machinery. Individual actors are seen as central participants in both of these orders, but there is also a collective vision of the institution insofar as legal importance is attached to features which are seen as generally attaching to individuals.
The European tradition for such a style of order is long-established. It goes back, at least, to the vow of stabilitas in loci of the Rule of St. Benedict in the sixth century. 13 This vow, at its most extreme, involved the lifelong commitment of the monk to remain within the monastery and abide by its way of life. It centred human identities around the identity of a place, 14 leading to a sacralisation of the place so that its boundaries were not just seen as physical ones but as enclosing a collective way of being. 15 This way of being set out a definition of stability as the incorporation of the individual into a collective body. This incorporation involved total immersion within the way of life of the monastery, its routines, roles, timetables and activities, and a commitment to the rules securing that way of life. 16 Finally, incorporation involved commitment to the ethos of the stabilitas. characterised by an idea of the monk's individuality, but this individuality was presumed to be marked by a particular disposition towards the monastery as representing a particular way of life and a commitment to subsume that individuality within it.
The notion of stabilitas within EU law is neither associated with a confined place such as the monastery nor a vow of commitment. Beyond that, however, the institutional assumptions used to make sense of EU law and EU fundamental rights follows the architecture set out by it quite closely. This involves, first, the identification and valuation of a place, in this case the European Union, with a particular way of life. This way of life comprises a detailed social order which has its own routines, ways of ordering the day, and relating individuals to others and to things. Secondly, collective processes are established for governing this order, securing its continuity and keeping it in equilibrium. Thirdly, an ethos seeks to mark out members as distinctive and to socialise them in both their relations with this way of life and those with its system of government. Finally, the individual is marked as a central element of this way of life. His participation marks it out as a lived order and serves to give it a material reality. However, it is also built around a collective idea of the individual and selfcultivation.
To consider the form taken by the EU stabilitas in more detail, this essay will divide it into two. In the first part, it will combine analysis of the first three elements: its way of life, mode of ordering and ethos. Fundamental rights go to incorporation and assertion of the individual within this socio-political order. This will require more time and thus will be addressed in its own section.
II. The Union as a Socio-Political Order

(i) The European Political Economy as a European Way of Life
The European Union is clearly marked out in territorial terms, but what way of life is associated with this territory which distinguishes it as special. It will be argued that in EU are rather seen as ends in themselves because they give rise to multiple forms of life.
The recognition of the life-giving qualities of these spheres of activity is reflected in EU law by its not seeking to constitute new spheres of activity. It does not establish new EU property rights or contractual forms. 18 To be sure, EU law might limit what is possible within these spheres of activity (e.g. discrimination within the workplace), regulate their invocation, or set conditions for their recognition in particular contexts (e.g. what constitutes a family or employment relationship to be protected by EU law). In this way, it can govern them significantly. However, its failure to constitute or terminate them is important as it results in these spheres of activity being seen as having their own operational logic, vernacular and norms: be these industrial standards, good commercial or employment practice, IT or scientific norms. As these spheres of activity give rise to law, these norms are seen as having a value of their own which must be deferred to. 19 These spheres of activity are also framed as pre-existing national law. Even something as constitutive of the national political community as nationality is not termed as something created and constituted by national law but as something whose loss and acquisition is conditioned by the latter. 20 The agency for acquiring or losing it is vested in individual and collective activities which take place separately from national law. These pre-existing qualities allow these spheres of activity to be regarded as phenomena which have certain common traits across the Union.
This pan-Union frame grants EU law a power of arrangement over the European political economy. This arrangement is not a neutral one. These spheres of activity are arranged so that they are related to each other as part of a European public economy, which has coherence and equilibrium through that lens. The system has to be stable and make sense at a macro-level, but it also has to ensure that individual processes both contribute to this general equilibrium and make sense, from this perspective in their own right. Secondly, if the tradition of public economy values these spheres of activity for their own sake, it accords public significance to them insofar as they contribute to the material necessities of life. 21 
(iii) An Ethos of Self Betterment
The ethos of this socio-political order is that of self-betterment. To justify any measure, the Union must show that it can realise the objectives of the latter better than any other legal order. This is both a formal requirement of EU law 32 and a wider dynamic in which EU law competes with other legal orders and forms of regulation to persuade political stakeholders that it offers advantages over these. 33 'Better', furthermore, is not simply a question of scale.
As a Qualified Majority or more of States have to be persuaded that EU law will offer them benefits not present on their own territory, 'better' invariably is a claim to a more effective, efficient and civil form of regulation.
The Union has relatively few administrative or financial resources of its own to secure these objectives. It has, therefore, to rely on the resources of its subjects and to harness these by acting on their actions. In other words, it depends for its goals on changes in their behaviour to secure ambitious collective goals: an ethos of collective or individual self-betterment. This can be achieved in a number of ways. It can be through acquiring capabilities which were not previously possessed, most obviously by aligning their processes with the latest technological developments. 34 It can be through establishing new forms of relationship whereby they harness their resources. 35 However, the most direct form is through requiring them to act more virtuously, be it through higher ecological standards, better consumer protection, stronger commitments towards equality, or tighter commitments towards universal service provision. 36 To be sure, this ethos is highly malleable and can be strongly contested in individual cases. At its core, however, is the imposition of responsibilities, often stringent ones, on private parties to contribute towards ambitious collective goals. 
III. The Three Autonomies
If stabilitas relies on the incorporation of the individual into a wider socio-political order, individual rights set out the individual as enjoying a discrete presence within this order, an agency of her own and recognition as an object of value. Fundamental rights express different dimensions to this presence, agency and value, and position these as central to the constitution and workings of this order. However alone, they can neither guide their own interpretation nor can they fully explain how the individual is to be related to this the wider socio-political order or how individuality is asserted against it. This is done, instead, through the notion of individual autonomy. Autonomy originated in Ancient Greece as meaning making one's own laws. It, therefore, comprises an individual presence which can assert itself and be asserted against others. Autonomy also involved a notion of the self and a quality of law-making which was derived from and could only be understood from the environment of which it formed part. 41 The side of autonomy goes, therefore, to how the individual is incorporated within this wider order from which she is seen to come. The balance between assertion and incorporation is, as we shall see, a shifting one. goals.
It is now time to consider each in more detail.
(i) Autonomy as individual control
Individual autonomy as individual control sees autonomy as the possession and exercise of rational agency and protection of this agency from encroachment by others. 42 Such autonomy is constituted by law -in this instance EU law -as law provides the conditions which inform and protect its agency. This vision of autonomy is described most emblematically by Article 52(1) of the Charter which secures legal protection only for the rights set out in the Charter, and then states that such rights may only be limited by law where necessary to meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 43 It only protects individuals, therefore, insofar as they are granted a legal presence by EU law. This entails not only that they must be recognised by it but also that the activities compromising their autonomy must be regulated by it. If either is not the case, EU law will simply hold that the matter is beyond its remit. 44 If this is to secure its institutional modesty, it also renders the individual, from the EU legal perspective, homo sacer: a person stripped of the protection of EU law and vulnerable to anything.
This autonomy comprises, first, an entitlement not to be submerged by other actors or processes governed by EU law. This includes the right to a formal identity which can be unambiguously ascertained. 45 This formal identity allows the holder to be granted rights by EU law and to have these protected by the law 46 and by the courts, 47 and political recognition of this form of identity in the form of the right to vote and stand for office. 48 It also grants her the right to be treated equally to others in the same position both substantively 49 and procedurally. 50 All this does not comprise the right to a more substantive identity which might reflect prior beliefs or dispositions, 51 but merely to be ascribed an identity on the same basis as others. 52 It is a thinner construct, therefore, than respect for singularity, which would involve regard and value to be had to the individuality and vulnerability of others 53 or individual self-ownership which would grant an individual full and exclusive rights of control and use over herself and her powers. 54 It grants, secondly, corporeal autonomy. 55 The individual's body is neither to be subject to procedures without her prior informed consent 56 nor be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. 57 Detention is also only to take place where the conduct of the accused warrants it and only if it is carried out with due diligence. 58 Thirdly, the public/private distinction in autonomy as self-control affords individuals a private capacity which shields them off from and cannot be integrated into wider processes.
the protection of which is conceived of as important for facilitating personal development. 59 Individuals neither have to disclose information about themselves unnecessarily 60 nor may others do this in an unwarranted fashion. 61 They have a right to private property and to protection of its substance. 62 Finally, respect is to be had for the individual's home. 63 However, this public/private distinction is very fluid. Highly intrusive information about a person's identity might still be held for a public purposes 64 and the substance of any property right can be eviscerated if compensation is paid. 65 The final dimension is a conception of the individual as a rational agent who must be allowed to use this rationality to plan her life and defend her legal position. There are general requirements of legal certainty and legal transparency. 66 However, it extends beyond these requirements to impose duties of accountability and due process on decision-makers.
There is, therefore, a duty for decision-makers to state the reasons for their decisions, 67 the right to fair legal process in all judicial proceedings, 68 and to good administration, which includes the right for an individual to be heard before any individual measure is taken which would adversely affect her. 69 Ryneš is an example of this form of autonomy. 70 The case concerned a householder whose property was subject to regular attacks and who installed video surveillance equipment to film the entrance to his property and the public highway outside to gather evidence. When it filmed two alleged perpetrators, these argued that the recording involved the processing of data, and therefore, under EU legislation, could not be used without their consent. There was an exception to this requirement of consent where the data was processed by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. Both parties argued that the EU legislation should be interpreted in the light of Article 7 of the Charter protecting the right to respect for private life. Two competing interpretations of this provision emerged. It was argued the creation of data about individuals without their knowledge or agreement could compromise their identities as it could lead to misrepresentation and vulnerability to external control. Against this, it was argued that the provision went to the possession of a private space, the home, which was secure and not violated. Both cases could be made through assertion of the right to respect for privacy, and it, alone, did not resolve the tensions.
The matter was decided through resort to autonomy as individual control. The first issue was whether the alleged perpetrators had a legal presence in EU law. The Court decided that they did by stating that the EU legislation governed any activities which constituted data processing. This included data which allowed a person to be identified and was automatically processed, as with the case here, with its storage and collection. The filming, therefore, generated a legal presence which granted entitlements under EU fundamental rights law for both parties. The Court noted the filming was directed outwards from the private setting and partially covered 'a public space.' In principle, this was something whose use required the perpetrator's consent. The public/private distinction comes to the fore with the idea that individuals have a freedom to use public spaces without their online identity being compromised or rendered vulnerable. However, the Court then balanced this by stating that EU law allowed protection of the legitimate interests pertaining to the private life of the data controller, such as protection of property, health, and life of his family and himself. The right to protect a private space from violation and to control over that space trumped the protection of online identities.
(ii) Relational autonomy
Relational autonomy serves to ensure that governmental activity protect those relations within the European political economy which are seen as integral to individual and collective well-being and to ensure that the individual is accorded adequate recognition and security within these relationships. district court placed the daughter in the custody of the mother on the grounds that she was now settled in Slovenia, wished to stay with her mother and it would be detrimental for her to be placed in a children's home. On referral, the Court of Justice centred its reasoning on Article 24(3) EUCFR which grants the child a fundamental right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both parents unless this is contrary to another interest of the child. It argued that this test merged into what was in the best interests of the child. In this case, the mother had made this impossible by absconding to Slovenia. This presumption was not an absolute one, however, as account also had to be taken account of the actual child and her social environment, something it was assumed that the Italian court had done here.
The reasoning was anchored around two foundations. One was that regular relations with both parents created well-being for the child, but did not subsume this well-being, so other factors could be brought in to rebut this presumption. The other was that the status of the child had to be recognised and cherished within the context of these relations. The child's well-being was both an outcome of these relations and something to be asserted within and against these relations. In this, reliance was had to highly stylised representations of both the relations and the subject. It was unclear how much contact with either parent the daughter would have as a result of being in a home. Little regard was paid to this but rather to the technical possibility for both parents to live close to the home and regularly see their daughter. Equally, recognition of the child did not involve recognition of the stated wishes but rather of an idea of what was in her best interests. integral to the Union market economy, most notably the social partners, 76 and professional 77 and trade union relations. 78 Relational autonomy also serves to protect relations between public authorities and the public but only where the former govern the European political economy by acting in a providential manner to secure the operation of its spheres of activity, most typically as regulators. In such instances, it protects not only the regulated party 79 but the sphere of activity more generally so it will also seek to secure the position of third parties who benefit from the public good at risk. 80 By contrast, the protection offered by relational autonomy is not present in other forms of relationship between the State and its subjects: be these fiscal, welfare or penal ones. There is protection of fundamental rights but the only autonomy protected is that of individual -control so the rights protected go to nondisclosure, 81 safeguarding of the body, 82 or protection of property rights. 83 The last protection relationship is that of the family. 84 On its face, this might seem odd to as the family is an intimate relationship which is neither concerned to secure profit nor political in nature. However, the genealogy of political economy emerged out of extending the metaphor of management of the household, oikonomia, to collective management of the welfare of the territory. 85 If family acted as the central inspiration for modern political economy, it is unsurprising that similar styles of reasoning are applied to it. EU fundamental rights law exercises a providential role concerned to regulate rather than constitute family relationships so it has not engaged with questions which go to definitions of the family such as same sex relationships, the place of foster children, or the threshold for marriage, but rather adopts received notions of family relations and parties' positions within them. 86 These relations must be seen as part of the European political economy rather than domestic or wider global processes. This will be so where EU law imposes obligations on one party which allow another party to enter a relationship with it or to assert a claim within an existing relationship. This might be where EU law allows an EU citizen to trade in another The other central question about relational autonomy is the degree of protection offered by it. It provides a more multifaceted recognition of individual qualities, wants and vulnerabilities than autonomy as individual control. As it goes to the possibility for the individual to enjoy a particular relationship or her treatment by or within it, concern is always with two things: the identity granted to her by that relationship (ie a worker, child,parent, broadcaster, consumer) and the identity asserted by her which transcends that relationship (ie gender, sexual orientation, traits, physical and emotional needs). This is 86 In McB, for example, the possibility for unmarried fathers to have custody over children in the case of separation was refused on the grounds that national law did not allow for it. Case C-400/10 PPU McB, EU:C:2010:582, paras 62-63. 87 Case 112/80 Dürbeck, EU:C:1981:94, para 44. 88 There is one exception where an EU citizen would be forced to leave the territory of the Union. This is a citizenship right, however. At that moment, it shifted the identity to parent qua parent, an identity transcending the employment relationship. 89 It noted that bringing up twins entailed greater effort and was not comparable to care of a single child. Special account should be taken of their needs either through the grant of leave that was longer than the minimum or through increased material assistance such as childcare or financial aid.
EU law has recognised a significant number of identities which transcend the relationship in question: be it those on whose grounds discrimination is prohibited; 90 particular needs such as the right to a home; 91 the role of carers 92 or environmental stakeholders. 93 There will inevitably be tensions whether sufficient identities are recognised 94 and why some are recognised at the expense of others. In Chatzi, therefore, the judgment was framed in terms of the rights of the parent with little attention paid to the autonomous rights of the child. 95 In addition, these transcendental identities must be made compatible with the relational identities which entrench relationships central to the European political economy. This leads, in the first place, to certain possibilities never being conceived as these would obviate employers were allowed to pay younger employees less, notwithstanding that these might already be earning less and this will inevitably impinge on their eventual pensions.
Invariably, this curtailed interpretation of individual identities stunts the entitlements necessary for self-realisation and generates a sense of a limited recognition of the identity in question.
(iii) Autonomy as individual flourishing
The third vision of autonomy is that of individual flourishing. This has EU law setting out structures which are to enable individuals to fulfil their potential, and it is a vision predicated on a narrative which emphasises self-realisation and, accordingly, the pursuit of individual potentiality. In this narrative, potentiality represents a latent capacity, with the direction and focus being towards realisation through this capacity. In reflection of these qualities, the concept of potentiality is to be found tightly intertwined into theories of the human condition and the self which emphasise continuity of life (self-realisation being a process which is conceived of as obtaining throughout life) and authenticity. The language is that of becoming, and advancing. meritocracy, it also went to how workers were to be viewed. They could not be reduced to their use value to employers but had a gendered identity which was to be respected through both external recognition and the provision of space for the individual to develop this identity.
Individual flourishing is cultivated in three ways by EU fundamental rights law: the recognition and grant of certain statuses, participation in the creation of collective goods, and contribution to the public sphere.
The first is the relationship between flourishing and a certain status. In some instances, the option of having these statuses is seen as necessary to allow individual flourishing. Examples include marriage and the right to found a family; 100 education; 101 to work or pursue an occupation 102 or business. 103 If relational autonomy serves to protect individuals within such relationships, individual flourishing allows individuals to enter them. In other instances, the status is seen as endangering the individual's possibility to flourish. EU fundamental rights law acts protectively here. Children have, thus, a right to such care and protection as is necessary for their well-being; 104 the elderly to dignity and independence and participation in cultural and social life; 105 the disabled a right to integration in the community; 106 young people not to be exploited in the workplace; 107 and a host of particularly vulnerable groups entitlement to social assistance and social security. 108 Status can also be seen as simultaneously necessary to secure well-being and as evidence of vulnerability. Working mothers are seen as securing their wellbeing through family and work but the demands of the former can make them vulnerable to discrimination so a number of maternity rights are offered. 109 This mode carries also a more ambivalent quality. In some instances, the nature of the status itself has proven to be heavily contingent on the presence of some underpinning stylised conceptualisation. Thus in C.D. and Z, in which two women, as commissioning mothers, had babies by surrogacy, and sought maternity leave, it was emphasised by the Court of
Justice that the conceptualisation of motherhood in EU law, for the purposes of maternity leave, is that of the gestational mother. 110 Maternity leave here was thus contingent on pregnancy and birth; 111 it was accordingly about the flourishing of the gestational mother qua worker only, and was consequently denied to the commissioning mothers.
The second mode of cultivating individual flourishing is through individuals participating in the creation of some collective good, the most highly ranking of which is that of the protection of human health and life. 112 Individual and collective goods elide into one another here. High levels of consumer and environment protection or public health require individuals to behave as wary consumers, green citizens or to manage their individual health. There is a thin line between the construction of conditions conducive for individual flourishing and asserting individual responsibility for this. In Deutsches Weintor, the local supervisory authority brought an action against a German winegrowing cooperative for marketing some of its members' wines as 'easily digestible' on the grounds that this was a prohibited health claim under EU legislation. 113 The Court interpreted the legislation in the light of, inter alia, Article 35(2) of the Charter which requires a high level of human health protection to be ensured in defining and implementing EU policies. It noted that whilst the wine might facilitate digestion, as a health claim it was incomplete as it was silent about other less healthy dimensions to the wine, notably those dangers inherent in the consumption of alcohol. The protection of public health justified a prohibition of the claim.
The Court conceived public health as a collective good which was to be protected from misleading claims by those marketing the goods. However, it also conceived of the individual as taking care of her own health. The central instrument for realising public health in this instance was, thus, the label, which relied on the idea of a health conscious and informed consumer who will not only read it, but also understand it and take measures to protect her health accordingly. If this allows her to flourish by leading a healthy lifestyle in line with her choices, it imposes a whole series of responsibilities to realise this.
The third mode of flourishing is contribution to the public sphere. In this, EU fundamental rights law links fundamental rights with EU citizenship, giving rise to a civic humanist conception of flourishing in which active citizenship and self-realisation are intertwined. guaranteed income for work done independently of the hours worked at the CAT. The case went to whether those admitted were entitled to payment in lieu of annual leave. They would be granted this if their activities were found to make them workers under EU law. 122 The right to annual leave contributes to individual flourishing as, according to the Court, it secures rest, leisure and relaxation, all necessary for well-being and self-development. 123 The curiosity of attaching the need for these to work became obvious when the Court tried to distinguish this case from others where it had ruled individuals in rehabilitation centres (in that case for drug addiction and alcoholism) were not workers because the activities were rehabilitative. In this instance, it argued that the activities were work as they had a certain economic value unlike the other activities. 124 Economic value would seem an odd basis to determine whether rest and relaxation was needed. Rehabilitative activities can be just as demanding as so-called economic ones. The judgment was equally contrived when looked at through the lens of the employment relationship. The relationship was for those not ready for the broader work place, and was structured to allow them as much space as necessary to recover. The idea of annual leave as a juste retour for labour provided over the year made little sense within such a context particularly as the relationship was structured to secure sufficient rest over its entire period.
IV. The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Reincorporation of the
Individual into a Reformulated European Stabilitas
These three autonomies incorporated the individual into the way of life represented by EU law, the European political economy, and allowed her to assert her place within this way of life and be seen as a central part of it. The Charter reshaped these processes of incorporation and assertion in three significant ways. It, first, increasingly required the European political economy to be seen in terms of the rights expressed by the Charter. However, this came at the price of increasingly shaping these rights in line with the demands of the European her to assert her position against these processes. However, it also led to new possibilities for her to assert her position within these processes. Private actors were now acknowledged as central to the government of this political economy as it was their actions which put it into play. The Charter was increasingly allowed to be asserted against these, albeit always within the confines of its being through the interpretation of EU legislation.
This will now be explained in more detail.
(i) A European Anthropology of the Human Condition Organised as Legal Policy
The Charter created a more congested space for fundamental rights by recognising many more rights than previously without the terrain of EU law being expanded correspondingly. 125 The consequent crowding resulted in the increased invocation of fundamental rights already mentioned. In turn, this generated a stronger sense of value salience within EU law. Fundamental rights were more obviously at the forefront of EU law with many pieces of EU legislation now viewed through their optic. In the Deutsches Weintor judgment mentioned earlier, there was, for example, reference not only to article 35, the provision on public health, but also those on freedom to choose an occupation and freedom to trade. 126 It is doubtful that a case on EU legislation governing misleading trade descriptions would previously have been couched in these terms. This value salience was symbolically important as it allowed EU law to depict a Union anthropology of the human condition in which the European political economy is increasingly set out as what it is to 125 The scope and detail of the Charter is well set out in S. Peers, T. This tighter incorporation of the individual into the government of the European political economy was evidenced most strongly in fundamental rights being increasingly used to interpret EU laws alongside their traditional role of reviewing EU measures. Time and again, reference was had to a Charter provision to justify why a particular interpretation of a provision of EU law should be taken. 129 In this, the teleologies of fundamental rights became submerged within wider EU legal policy. In many instances, this was done explicitly where EU legislation was characterised as an expression of a fundamental right so that the meaning of the latter became revealed through the content of the former. 130 In other instances, and more commonly, the relationship is reversed and EU legislation is interpreted in the light of a fundamental right. However, the content of that right has still to be couched in the language of the legislation in question: be this the right to human dignity being framed in the language of legislation on the patenting of biotechnology so that it goes to what human organisms can be owned 131 or the right to private life in the light of data protection measures so that its content circulates around such things as the safeguards to be put in place for individual data to be transferred to non EU authorities. 132 (
ii) From Individual Fundamental Rights to Collective Goods
The second dynamic was a consequence of the types of right now deemed worthy of protection. Most of the rights traditionally protected by EU law expressed an idea of moral correctness (ie freedom from torture, respect for private and family life, freedom of expression, the right to trade or own property). The Charter included a significant number of rights of a different quality. These expressed a desired state of affairs which should be strived towards. They were more closely identified with the realisation of some collective good, whereas the former were more strongly associated with principles of individual behaviour. If, once again, this broadening of the range of fundamental rights was an attempt to identify much more strongly with a more sweeping vision of a good life, it also entailed the emasculation of individual singularity and vulnerability by the demands of these collective goods.
In some instances, these fundamental rights are, therefore, cast simply as collective goods with no reference to individual entitlements (eg the provisions on freedom of the arts and sciences; cultural, religious and linguistic diversity; environmental protection and consumer protection). 133 In others, there is provision for individual access whilst acknowledgement that the right is about protecting a collective good (eg public health; services of general economic interest). 134 The most formal recognition of this shift was in AMS where the Court stated that certain provisions were only judicially cognisable insofar as they were given 131 specific expression by national or EU law. 135 These rights were, in other words, collective goods which could only be examined through the lens of the practical steps taken to realise them rather than through what might be granted individuals directly.
This has been accompanied by a more pervasive shift to the perception of fundamental rights as being more broadly about the realisation of collective goods. 136 This was particularly striking in relation to the prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment set out in article 4 of the Charter: a right which, intuitively, one would assume should be least viewed in this way.
In NS, the Court had to consider whether asylum seekers should be sent back to the Member State responsible for considering their claim where there was a risk that they might be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. 137 The central good in question, for the Court, was the common European asylum system and it interpreted the duty of States to respect fundamental rights in the light of this. It stated that the system was based on mutual trust and a presumption of compliance with fundamental rights obligations by Member States.
Any violation of an individual's fundamental right would, thus, be insufficient to prohibit return, presumably as checking whether this was the case would undermine the mutual trust and presumptions of the common European asylum system and this was to be granted a greater worth than individual violations. Instead, the threshold for non-return would be that of systemic violations in the receiving State, which were there. The individual, thus, almost completely disappears from this account as a collective good is to be followed except where there is a failure on a collective scale. In M'Bodj the Court went further and stated that collective goods could be used to determine whether a situation could be reviewed against the prohibition on torture. 138 The case concerned a Mauritanian denied asylum in Belgium but who had been granted leave to remain, and suffered from a serious potentially life- instructions on how to interpret the Charter -be this in line with other EU law provisions, the ECHR, national constitutions or Explanations of the Secretariat. 143 To be coherent and authoritative, an interpretation had to be a rigorous interpretation of the formal text, consistent with earlier case law and other provisions of the Charter whilst simultaneously making sense of these other human rights laws, their relationship to each other and to EU law. This exacting task required its own modus operandi. As a result, if there was some reference to the modes of interpretation mentioned in the Charter, it was more common to be no reference at all. Instead, the Court developed a new interpretive logic of its own, a governmental logic, to make sense of this new terrain. Europe. 146 The reasoning has some coherence if it is borne in mind that this was a case about This reasoning has, however, been sparsely and selectively deployed. There are instances when the Court has been invited to use it but has based its reasoning on completely different grounds. 150 There is only one instance where it was deployed to guide EU legislation. 151 Thirdly, institutional responsibilities were recast so that the central actors responsible for the governing the European political economy were bound by EU fundamental rights. This has followed two tracks with regard to review and to interpretation respectively.
Review goes to preventing an EU or national institutions from violating fundamental rights.
If the argument of this piece is correct and EU fundamental rights laws contribute to sustaining the European political economy, it would fall that measures would only be taken to review institutional action where it disrupts this political economy. Historically, EU law has been somewhat obscure on this, holding actions of the EU Institutions and national measures fall within the scope of EU law to be reviewed. 153 This has changed in recent years with a much more finessed test emerging with regard to when national measures can be reviewed. The Court has held that these can be reviewed against EU fundamental rights when the measure is covered by EU law. This will be so in three circumstances: the national measure was intended to implement a provision of EU law, it pursues objectives which are the same as EU law, and there are specific rules of EU law capable of affecting it. 154 The first of these, implementing specific EU laws, goes to measures required by EU law to secure or regulate the European political economy whilst the second goes to national measures which parallel and have the same objectives as EU law, which is to secure and regulate the European political economy in the same manner as it. The third goes to a duty on the part of national law not to disrupt the European political economy. Many national measures could have adverse effects on the European political economy but the Court indicates, however, that there must be a tight connection between the national measure and EU law before it will be considered sufficiently disruptive to be governed by EU fundamental rights. It must be governed by specific EU laws which, and this is implicit, render any disruption to EU objectives discrete, evident and legally identifiable.
This governmental logic is even starker in relation to the interpretation of EU legislation. A feature of government is that it relies on private actors to realise public objectives through inducing them to behave in particular ways. The ambition of many governmental objectives 
V. EU Fundamental Rights and the Crisis
There is much to be uneasy about in this. Interpretations of fundamental rights emphasising human singularity, vulnerability and solidarity are lost in this process. There is no problematisation of the structures making up the European political economy, the asymmetries generated by these or the wider injustices beyond that. This is unsurprising if EU fundamental rights are remembered to be a constitutive part of a legal order that has never really done these things. It is against this backdrop that we now turn to see their role within the sovereign debt crisis. To do this, we will return to the three forms of individual autonomy described as these set out how the EU legal order relates the individual to the crisis.
(i) Individual Control
The central instance in which autonomy as individual control arose was the Pringle judgment. 155 Pringle, an Irish MP, challenged the compatibility of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the process through which conditional financial support was offered to euro area States whose public finances had run into significant difficulties, with EU law. The terms of support were determined by a Board of Governors comprising the euro area finance ministers and negotiated and overseen by the Commission, ECB and IMF. 156 which the individual as a rational agent must, to have control over her own agency, be allowed to exercise this rationality to defend her legal position by arguing it before a court. 158 The Court was terse in its dismissal of the presence of such a right. It noted that the Charter, by virtue of Article 51(1), only bound Member States when these were implementing EU law. In this instance, Member States were not implementing EU law as the ESM was something agreed by the Member States outside the competences of the Treaties.
Even on its own formal terms, this reasoning is unconvincing on two grounds. First, a number of EU Institutions -the ECB, the Commission and the Court -were central to the operation of the ESM. Under Article 51, the Charter applies to these independently of whether they are implementing EU law. Insofar as the ESM sought to take these beyond the reach of the Charter, there were real questions about its illegality that were unaddressed. The argument has to make sense in terms of what the Court sees EU law is above so that it can claim that it has provide a coherent and authoritative account of the limits of Union competencies.
The answer can be found in the particular vision adopted of the European political economy. If the central fare of the MoU -welfare cuts, control of public finances, tax rises, privatisations and the search for macroeconomic equilibrium -are what many political economists consider to be their bread and butter, the Court framed it rather differently. The
European political economy is framed, it will be remembered, as a Union arrangement of a variety of spheres of activities that make up life. It relies on a number of bases, however, which are central to allowing these spheres of activity to operate. In some instances, these are listed, as with Article 119(3) TFEU which sets out stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. However, in all cases these bases act as the foundation for the European political economy rather than being part of it. foreclosed. 165 Sánchez Morcillo dealt with one of these cases. 166 It concerned a 2013 law which improved the position of the creditor vis-à-vis the debtor by allowing the former to appeal any decision by a court on enforcement of the mortgage but not the latter. The court of first instance was, moreover, not required to consider whether the mortgage arrangement was unfair, unless asked, and the debtor was given only fifteen days to raise any such issues. It The reason goes to the slanted allocation of value provided by relational autonomy in EU law. Relational autonomy occurs, it will be remembered, within the context of EU legal ordering of valued spheres of activity. EU law will govern employment, commercial, consumer relations and so on with a view to nurturing them. Within this context the relational autonomy offered by EU fundamental rights may secure a more multifaceted recognition for parties within these spheres of activity and protection of the existing relations constitutive of these spheres of activity. However, this is necessarily structured by the spheres of activity within which it takes place.
Actors are only recognised, first, in terms of their contribution to these spheres of activity.
The most famous case in EU law, Van Gend en Loos, is an example. Individual rights were granted in EU law for the first time, but, if one looks a little closer, they are very confined.
They are only granted to individuals to transact transnationally without paying customs duties. 167 This affects the quality of right granted. In Sánchez Morcillo, the mortgagee was only recognised as a party to a consumer contract which was contributing to a market in mortgages with a notionally high level of consumer protection. To be sure EU fundamental rights might provide a richer account of what this involved, but it was his position as a transactor which was to be protected as it was this which tied him to the sphere of activity. It was not his relationship to other things, such as ownership of the home. The judgment was not framed, therefore, in terms of what it could do to protect that through protection of his right to property. Nor was it framed in terms of his other relationships to his other people. It was, thus, irrelevant whether enforcement would have a particularly negative effect on family life. To many, this would seem a peculiar way of valuing the process.
Binding fundamental rights to spheres of activity in this way clearly forecloses the application of many. There is, however, a further reason why relational autonomy has been so redundant in the face of the crisis. It grants rights to individuals who contribute to European political economy's spheres of activity, many of which are market activities. A depressing feature of the crisis is that it has prevented many, indeed the most desperate, from contributing in these terms to these activities. Vulnerable and marginalised, there are fewer possibilities to work, purchase or consume. Family life has equally been disrupted.
These people, in short, have been pushed outside the European political economy, and EU fundamental rights, correspondingly, does nothing to help to them.
(iii) Individual Flourishing
There is least to be said about individual flourishing. As mentioned earlier, it has secondorder qualities. It is only triggered in instances where activities are regulated by EU law and generate entitlements for the person claiming it. This has resulted in its presenting a dichotomous face during the crisis.
There are those relationships regulated by EU law where the actor is seen as contributing to a valued sphere of activity of the European political economy. EU law grants her entitlements and, in such instances, individual flourishing continues to be cultivated around these. Furthermore, a wide view is taken of when an individual is making a contribution.
Cases on the granting of annual leave have taken a broad view of when individuals are working and the quantity of that work to determine their entitlement to leave. 168 Non EU nationals lawfully working in the European Union have had requirements that they have sufficient resources to support their families whittled down to enable their families and children to live with them. 169 However, a challenge of the crisis is that those most vulnerable and subject to suffering are not deemed as contributing to these spheres of activity. They fall outside this zone and, thus, are not offered entitlements.
These perceived non-contributors are doubly unprotected. They are, first, not offered any individuals the status, participation in the realisation of collective goods and opportunities within the public sphere that are deemed necessary to realise successful modern identities. 170 This is simply seen as something individuals must recover however they can. This abandonment by EU fundamental rights has set out a meme that those outside the European political economy do not deserve to participate in the goods of modern life.
Conclusion
If truth be told, the European Union has taken fundamental rights very seriously, and that is part of the challenge. They are constructed as a central part of the order it sets out, and, as a reflection of this, can be more managerial, partial and sympathetic to modern market excesses than national counterparts and less attentive to the singularity, vulnerability and potential of human existence. They can also be more attuned to its complexities and the stresses and demands posed for individuals by these market processes. As a consequence, it is unsurprising that there has often been innovation. This is not an argument for disposing with EU fundamental rights but for lowering the ambitions expected of them and seeing them as part of a wider EU legal context which will inevitably contain much to criticise and much to offer. 170 The only vague wave to this is acknowledgement that EU governance of the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances must not prejudice the right to collective action or to negotiate and conclude collective agreements. Regulation 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011, L 306/25, Article 1(3).
